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It is not a secret that the EU has sought to 
infl uence regional developments by imposing 
liberal democratic norms on the third coun-
tries interested in closer relations with the 
union. Given that this soft power approach 
may effect change, we analysed the role of 
EU normative powers in infl uencing human 
rights dialogues. We also saw how both the 
political establishments and societies at large 
have adapted to these new circumstances. 
Further to the east, the lever for European-
ization seems to be eroding. To that end, the 
EU has continuously reaffi rmed that its sup-
port for and cooperation with target countries 
must be conditional on the promotion of civil 
liberties and democratic reforms. While there 
is concern that the EU’s normative policies 
may be ineffective if they are not fully imple-
mented on the ground, it is possible that the 
prospect of EU integration could prove to be 
an attractive aspiration for large segments of 
these societies. Fully implementing EU norms, 
however, may drive these countries into con-
fl ict with the conservative mores sustained by 
the state/religious institutions.
This memo focuses on the South Cauca-
sus where the EU has tried to “softly” in-
crease its leverage by imposing liberal dem-
ocratic norms on the countries in a region 
interested in closer relations with the union. 
Although all three are Eastern Partnership 
countries, they are moving in different di-
rections: Georgia is interested in integra-
tion with Western structures; Armenia was 
heading along the European track but made 
a sudden U-turn in September 2014 when 
it aligned itself to the Eurasian Customs 
Union; Azerbaijan has remained undecided. 
This variation is refl ected by the (un)willing-
ness of the political elite of these respective 
countries to participate in human rights di-
alogues, to harmonize national legislations 
with European norms and values, and fi nal-
ly, to implement new regulations in practice.
It appears that accepting European 
norms has only been welcomed on the sur-
face, while the implementation of new reg-
ulations in practice has been problematic. 
When comparing the three Caucasian coun-
tries, striking differences appear. Georgia 
has been the most keen on adapting its own 
value system and has become more liber-
al and reform-minded. Azerbaijan has the 
least desire to change, preferring to keep 
things as they are. Armenia falls somewhere 
in between – accommodation of Europe-
an norms is welcome, yet inaction and the 
government’s slow approach to improving 
law enforcement reveals diffi culties in im-
plementation. An additional challenge to 
implementing EU norms could be the asym-
metric relation between the South Caucasus 
countries and the Union: meeting the pre-
scribed norms will not be rewarded with an 
invitation to accession talks. 
During the seven rounds of EU-Armenia 
human rights dialogues and nine rounds of 
EU-Georgia dialogues, the sides discussed 
the existing mechanisms for the protection 
of human rights in these countries. Georgia 
is the only one of the three that has passed a 
comprehensive anti-discrimination law pro-
tecting homosexuals from discrimination, 
while Azerbaijan has preferred to avoid 
human rights dialogue of any kind and, in 
many ways, has not been inclined to adopt 
the EU’s normative agenda. Regardless of 
the position of the countries’ governments, 
the EU norms have had a minimal effect on 
the way these societies treat their ethnic, re-
ligious and sexual minorities. Participating 
in dialogue is usually perceived as an easy 
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task to fulfi l, but implementation poses 
enormous challenges because all three soci-
eties are, for the most part, religious, deeply 
traditional and defi ned by conservative val-
ues. 
The Armenian Apostolic Church and the 
Georgian Orthodox Church are considered 
national churches with special status and 
privileges in Armenia and Georgia, respec-
tively. They have played a major role in iden-
tity politics and national consolidation ef-
forts. Religious affi liation is largely nominal 
in Azerbaijan; percentages for actual practic-
ing members of a faith are much lower. In 
terms of religiosity, Armenia and Georgia sit 
at one end of the religious spectrum while 
Azerbaijan has a place at the opposite, more 
secular extreme. The comprehensive data of 
the World Values Survey, which combines 
multiple dimensions of religiosity, demon-
strate a repeating pattern where Azerbaijani 
society is the least and Georgian society the 
most religious in terms of self-identifi cation, 
regular religious practice, the importance of 
religion in socialization and public trust in 
religious institutions.
There are innate cultural predispositions 
towards the values of democracy in both 
Georgia and Armenia, which should also 
logically apply to that part of the Western 
value system supporting tolerance, diver-
sity and respect for minorities of all forms 
(Matrosyan 2015). Yet this may be wishful 
thinking. What is the most striking is the 
fact that all three countries reformed their 
legislations to ensure the rights of sexual mi-
norities as a follow-up to their entry into the 
Council of Europe in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Furthermore, Georgia and Armenia 
have made a big leap forward in the frame-
work of human rights dialogues conducted 
by the EU. Yet, at the societal level radical 
attitudes are slow to disappear. Politicians 
seek popularity by playing on society’s val-
ues and national ideologies. Priests take part 
in homophobic rallies and warn people not 
to go against “God’s will”. Police feel reluc-
tant to step in when ultra-orthodox Chris-
tians attack those who promote change.
The Eu expects that the change of value 
orientations will naturally follow liberaliza-
tion of legislation regulating sexuality, gen-
der and family. On the surface, this expecta-
tion makes sense because all South Caucasus 
countries are maintaining their commitment 
to strengthening of “democracy, rule of law, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms” 
(Riga Declaration of May 2015). In practice, 
however, the liberalization of legislation 
regulating sexuality has not been supported 
or initiated by social demand (which typi-
cally has been the case in Western Europe-
an societies). Instead of having an intended 
positive effect on social attitudes, the laws 
passed in parliament have intensifi ed social 
polarization over the issue, as we have seen 
in the case of the anti-discrimination law in 
Georgia.
South Caucasus countries differ in their 
geopolitical aspirations, state reactions to EU, 
and levels of religiosity. They share, how-
ever, strongly traditional and conservative 
attitudes toward gender and sexuality. The 
societal perceptions in the South Caucasus 
highlight masculinity as a safeguard for the 
survival of society and the family.1 Women 
must be protected; they should only be mar-
ginally present in public and should serve 
their husbands in every way. Unmarried 
heterosexuals over 30 are rarely accepted in 
society; those with no children and not in a 
relationship are under enormous social pres-
sure. Most families in the South Caucasus 
see homosexuals as shameful because their 
1 See Georgia: Between Modernity and the Middle Ages, http://www.gwi-boell.de/en/2013/05/30/georgia-be-
tween-modernity-and-middle-ages [Accessed 21 November 2016]; LGBT Rights in the South Caucasus, http://www.
gwi-boell.de/en/2013/05/30/lgbt-rights-south-caucasus [Accessed 21 November 2016]
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apparently “deviant” behaviour threatens 
social unity and the continuity of the fami-
ly. Homosexual men are seen as a source of 
insecurity and weakened self-defence be-
cause it is thought that young men may be 
“infected” and thereby destroy society from 
the inside. Sexual minorities become objects 
of public aggression, social ostracism and vi-
olence. In short, those who want to belong in 
society must adopt traditional values regard-
ing cultural norms and religious morals. 
When we turn to the World Values Sur-
vey results, the least tolerant society is Azer-
baijan, in all possible categories: 58 percent 
did not want to have people of a different 
race as neighbours, 26 percent did not want 
people who speak a different language as 
neighbours and 58 percent did not want to 
have unmarried couples living together as 
neighbours. Only Armenia beats Azerbaijan 
in religious exclusivity – 57 percent of Ar-
menian respondents want to have people 
of a different religion as neighbours. The 
survey results also confi rm that the South 
Caucasus countries remain the three least 
tolerant societies in Europe in terms of atti-
tudes towards homosexuality, despite their 
level of Europeanization and the depth of 
integration with the EU (Kuyper et al. 2013). 
Among the 15 European countries surveyed 
by World Values Survey 2010-2014, South 
Caucasus societies were the top three in the 
percentage of respondents who considered 
homosexuality “never justifi able” – 95 per-
cent in Armenia, 93 percent in Azerbaijan, 
86 percent in Georgia. 
Quest for pro-European stance
As demonstrated above, the EU’s ability 
to win hearts and minds may face consid-
erable challenges due to cultural differenc-
es over social issues and its mixed record in 
support of diversity and the human rights 
agenda. Although Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan have chosen different develop-
ment tracks and have displayed uneasy and 
varied allegiances to the imposition of EU 
norms, all three are conservative societies 
with intolerant views on sexual minorities. 
George Mchedlishvili from Chatham House 
notes that ‘taking a fi rm and principled line 
in support of protections for LGBT commu-
nities, for example, could come at a political 
cost’ (2016, p. 11), and that this is the biggest 
dilemma for Europeanization in the region. 
Whether that has an effect on public percep-
tions of EU integration will be discussed next.
The EU is an important player in the re-
gion whose main interest is providing sta-
bility and security along its borders by pro-
moting a normative value system. Its policy 
is based on the sincere belief that the trans-
formation of the South Caucasian countries 
serves this purpose. It has proven to have 
limited soft power potential – it remains at-
tractive but only to a relative degree. Pub-
lic opinion polls show more favourable at-
titudes towards EU integration in Georgia 
and less favourable attitudes in Azerbaijan 
(Caucasus Barometer 2013). The largest 
share of non-supporters came from Armenia 
(23 percent), whereas Azerbaijanis stood out 
with their indifference on this question (32 
percent of respondents did not care about 
their country’s Europeanization). Two years 
later, the support rate for EU membership 
had dropped to 42 percent in Georgia while 
staying more or less the same in Armenia 
(39 percent). At the same time, the number 
of respondents against EU membership in-
creased to 16 percent of the Georgian sample 
(Caucasus Barometer 2015). 
Dominant national religious institutions in 
Georgia and Armenia constitute a challenge 
for the EU. These religious institutions have a 
privileged status by default; they are relative-
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ly autonomous from the government; they are 
highly trusted by society; they play a role in 
the political processes and, as far as the legal 
regulation of gender, family and sexuality is 
concerned, these institutions have their own 
interests and stake in the game. In regard to 
the introduction of liberal EU norms, these 
religious institutions are the local bastions of 
conservative attitudes par excellence. At mo-
ments of unrest, the leaders and representa-
tives of these institutions are the ones which 
argue that national values and traditions are 
at risk of being compromised. 
This means there is a good reason to as-
sume that very religious people are most 
likely to reject the EU’s normative agenda, 
which goes against the traditional value sys-
tem and shakes the authority of religious in-
stitutions. The most logical outcome would 
be a clear rejection of EU membership aspi-
rations, which might be seen to “let the devil 
in”. For example, while in 2013 both Georgia 
and Armenia were fi nalizing preparations 
to meet the AA/DCFTA preconditions set 
by the EU, in the form of several rounds of 
human rights dialogues which enabled the 
start of anti-discriminatory legislation, there 
were clear examples of violence against sex-
ual minorities in both countries in 2012. In 
May 2012, a diversity march in Georgia took 
place against the background of aggressive 
protests by opponents of the demonstra-
tion, and at the same time three youngsters 
burned down DIY, the fi rst gay bar in Arme-
nia. There were clearly heightened tensions 
in all three countries, yet this angst is not re-
fl ected in the public opinion polls.
To sum up, tensions run highest in select-
ed policy areas (liberalization of norms re-
lated to gender and sexuality) where chang-
es are not enthusiastically welcomed by 
local populations, yet opposition to a single 
dimension of EU policies seems to coexist 
with a general positive attitude regarding 
the EU. The fi rst wave of the Annual Sur-
vey Report of Eastern Partnership countries 
(2016) demonstrated that the EU enjoyed a 
high level of trust in general, and that in Ar-
menia and Georgia the EU was trusted even 
more than national political parties, the par-
liament or the government. If and when dis-
satisfaction about the imposition of liberal 
social norms has an impact on the general 
reception of Europeanisation in the South 
Caucasus are questions for  policy-makers 
in the EU. They will need to decide whether 
to make corrections in the imposed policies 
and see the EU’s role grow in the region, or 
the opposite: leave things as they are, and 
conclude that support will probably remain 
too limited to implement social change in 
value systems.
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